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Pension plans have long been a concern of organized labor. Some of the 
earliest pension plans for blue-collar workers were originated by unions. ’ 
Following the 1949 Inland Steel decision by the Supreme Court, pensions 
became a mandatory bargaining topic and the subject of nearly all collec- 
tive negotiations.* Some 30 years later union concerns with pensions ex- 
panded from issues relating to worker benefits to the use of pension fund 
money in the capital market, raising new economic and legal questions re- 
lating to union economic power. 
This paper examines what unions do to pensions and pension plans in 
the context of the “two faces” model of unionism, which treats unions as 
institutions of monopoly power and of collective voice. It argues that the 
effects of unionism on pensions are better understood by this model than 
by the simple monopoly perspective that permeates much economic think- 
ing about unions. Section 4.1 sketches out the implications of union mo- 
nopoly power and of union voice on pensions. Section 4.2  presents a de- 
tailed analysis of  the impact of  unionism on the provision of  pension 
plans, using data from both establishment and worker surveys. It shows 
that, other factors held fixed, unionism has a significant and sizable effect 
on the probability that blue-collar workers are covered by pension plans 
and that unionization also alters the factors determining coverage. Sec- 
tion 4.3 contrasts the provisions of union and nonunion pension plans. 
Section 4.4 shows how union pension plans alter the age-earnings profile 
of union workers and thus estimates how unionism affects the earnings of 
workers of different ages. Section 4.5 explores the recent efforts of unions 
to direct pension fund investments away from nonunion firms into pro- 
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jects beneficial to unionized workers. The paper concludes with a brief 
summary. The Appendix describes in detail the various data sets used in 
the analysis. 
4.1  What Unions Should Do to Pensions 
The potential impact of unionism on the provision of pensions can be 
decomposed into two separate effects: the effect of unionism on pension 
spending that results from union monopoly power raising costs of  labor, 
and the effect of unionism on the pension share of a given compensation 
package. Formally, let p = expenditures on pensions per hour, c = total 
compensation per hour, x = diverse other factors that affect pensions, 
andu = unionism. 
Then, using standard regression formulas, the impact of unionism is 
(1)  bpu-x  = bpu.cx + bcu-x  bpc-ux, 
where bpuex = total effect of unionism on pensions (holding fixed con- 
trols x),  bpu-cx  = effect of unionism on the pension share of labor cost 
(since c is fixed), bcu-x  = effect of unionism on total compensation, and 
bpc-ux  = effect of compensation on pensions, holding unionism fixed. 
Differentiating between the union impact on the share of compensation 
going to pensions (bpu-cx)  and the impact on the level of compensation 
(bcu  ex) and through it on demand for pensions (bpc.  ux)  is important be- 
cause the forces that determine the pension share are likely to differ from 
those determining total compensation and its associated pension spend- 
ing. Whereas the impact of  unionism on total compensation is readily 
analyzable in the context of the standard monopoly “face” of unionism in 
which union market power is used to raise pecuniary rewards to workers, 
the impact of unionism on the pension share is not so readily explicable. 
An increase in spending on pensions with total compensation fixed neces- 
sarily means a decrease in spending on wages or other fringes. A simple 
monopoly model does not tell us whether a union would prefer pensions 
to wages, or vice versa. To understand the preferences of unions for one 
or the other requires analysis of the “voice” face of the institution and the 
factors that might lead a collective democratic organization to be more (or 
less) willing than workers in a competitive setting to forgo dollars of wages 
for pension benefits. 
4.1.1  The Voice Model 
In a world in which some workers are more or less permanently  at- 
tached to firms while others are movable, there are good reasons to  expect 
the political nature of unions to lead to greater preferences for pensions 
than would be expressed by workers in a competitive market. The most 
important reason is that in general the union will give greater weight to the 91  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
preferences of the older, relatively permanent employee relative to those 
of younger, more mobile one than will a competitive market in which the 
desires of the marginal employee set the compensation package.  In the 
context of a median voter model, the union would represent the tastes of 
the median worker as opposed to the marginal worker. If older, presum- 
ably less mobile workers have greater desires for pensions, the demand for 
pensions will then be greater under collective than individual bargaining. 
Hence, firms that engage in collective bargaining are likely to allot a greater 
share of compensation to pension benefits. 
Formally, I represent the postulated differential attachment of workers 
to firms by an upward-sloping supply schedule dependent on wages and 
pensions: 
(2) 
where L = the number of workers supplied to the firm. LW(Lp)  is the par- 
tial derivative of L with respect to W(P). 
The inverse function of  (2), relating wages to pensions and employ- 
ment, defines the supply price of pensions: 
(3) 
Cost minimization by the firm faced with this supply price requires, for 
any given L, an interior solution P*  such that a dollar of pensions reduces 
the marginal wage cost of labor by one dollar:’ 
L(U:  PI, Lw > 0,  LP  > 0, 
W(RL),  W < 0, WL  < 0. 
(4)  WdP*,L)  = -1. 
The firm will provide pensions when at the optimal value P*  the reduction 
in wages covers variable costs and the fixed cost (C)  of instituting the pro- 
gram: 
(5) 
where  W(0,L)  is the wage paid in the absence of pension and W(0,L) - 
W(P?,L)  is the savings of wages from introducing pensions. According to 
equation (4),  expenditures on pensions in a nonunion setting depend on 
the marginal evaluation of pensions by the marginal (L‘”)  worker,  Wp(E 
L).  According to equation (5)  initiation of a particular benefit depends on 
the change in wages W(0,  L) - W(P?,  L)  exclusive of any potential infra- 
marginal “worker surplus.” 
By contrast, the supply price set by the union will depend on the oper- 
ation of the union as a political entity and the resultant union maximand. 
In this paper I consider two schematic models of union behavior: a median 
voter model and an optimizing cartel model. Under both models, and rea- 
sonable mixtures or variants thereof, it can be demonstrated that worker 
demand for pensions will be higher under unionism. 
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Consider first the case in which the union seeks to maximize the prefer- 
ence function of the median worker. If all workers are ordered from zero 
to L in terms of greatest to least attachment to the firm, the value of pen- 
sions to workers will be W(R  L/2).4  Cost minimization by the firm leads 
to the interior solution, P“,  that satisfies 
(6)  wp,  L/2) = -  1 
(7)  L[W(O,L/2)  - W(R  L/2)]  > LIy: + c. 
and to the condition for introducing the pension, R of 
If, as assumed, marginal workers have less desire for pensions than infra- 
marginal workers,  WAR L/2) < WAR L).  As a consequence, P  > P* 
and the union firm will be more likely to introduce pensions than the non- 
union firm. 
As an alternative, consider the behavior of a union that, for reasons of 
logrolling and internal redistribution of  benefits among members, oper- 
ates like an optimizing cartel.5  Such a union will be assumed to maximize 
total worker surplus, defined as the area above the supply curve: 
(8)  Lw(R L) - j$  W(e  X)dX. 
Maximization requires an interior solution, F,  that satisfies 
(9)  Wp(Pc,  L) - 1/L  55  Wp(Pc,  X)dX = 0, 
where 1/L Jk  Wp(PC,  X)  is the average value of the pension and the condi- 
tion for providing it is 
(10)  1/L  {$ W(P;,  X)dX > Pf7 + C/L. 
When the average value is greater (in absolute value) than the marginal 
value, Pc will  exceed P*. When the  “average surplus,”  1/L 55  W(P;, 
X)dX, exceeds the saving in wages  W(0,  L) - W(Pi,  L),  the union firm 
will be more likely than the nonunion firm to initiate particular programs. 
Both of these conditions hold when WPL  < 0, that is, when, as postulated, 
marginal workers have less desire for pensions than inframarginal work- 
ers. 
Although both the median voter and optimal cartel models represent 
polar cases, which ignore numerous complexities of union behavior, they 
shed light on the difference between the demand for pensions under col- 
lective and individual bargaining. The prediction of greater allocation of 
funds to pensions under unionism does not depend on the precise model 
of union behavior but rather on the broad principle that, as political insti- 
tutions, unions are likely to weigh more heavily than will nonunion firms 
the preferences of inframarginal workers who tend to be especially desir- 
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4.1.2  Additional Routes of the Union Effect 
Trade unionism is likely to raise demand for pensions in several other 
ways as well. First, by increasing the length of the attachment between 
workers and firms (raising job tenure and lowering quit rates) unionism 
will increase the likelihood that workers will receive pensions. As a result, 
the value to workers will be greater under unionism, raising the willing- 
ness of workers to forgo wages to obtain these pensions (Freeman 1980). 
Second, in sectors of the economy in which workers are attached to oc- 
cupations rather than employers (e.g., construction), or in which firms 
are relatively small (trucking), unions provide the type of large permanent 
market  institution needed to operate most pension programs. Without 
unions  (or  some  comparable  structure)  the  probability  that  workers 
would receive deferred benefits would be too small and the employer’s 
start-up costs too high for most benefits to be economically sensible. Multi- 
employer programs, of the type initiated by unions in the aforementioned 
industries, are needed, with portability across employers and the size to 
reduce average set-up costs. 
Third, as argued by Freeman  (1976), Hirschman (1976), and Nelson 
(1976), unions may elicit more accurate information about workers’ pref- 
erences than can be gained from individual bargaining, which may also 
lead to greater provisions of  pensions. Conceptually, the adversary rela- 
tion between employers and employees-the  fact that the level as well as 
allocation of the compensation package is at stake-argues  for circum- 
spection by workers in providing their employer with information about 
their  preferences.  If  employers had  complete knowledge of  employee 
preference functions, they would seek to extract all of the worker surplus, 
striking a bargain that would leave workers at their minimum acceptance 
point. This provides a motivation for nonunion employees to withhold in- 
formation about preferences. As the agent of workers, on the other hand, 
unions should obtain a more accurate revelation of preferences through 
their internal process of bargaining over the pay package that will be ac- 
ceptable to the majority of members; in this way, unions may play an espe- 
cially important role in eliciting employees’ desire for pensions. 
Fourth, the complexities involved in evaluating the costs and prospec- 
tive benefits of  pensions may make workers more willing to “buy” them 
when they have a specialized agent, like a union, evaluating and monitor- 
ing employer claims and programs. Significant investments in knowledge 
that lie beyond the purview of individual workers are needed to  judge the 
true  cost  and  future  benefits  of  alternative  compensation  packages. 
Union lawyers, actuaries, and related experts are one institutional mecha- 
nism by which workers can obtain the expertise to bargain over these di- 
verse benefits. 94  Richard B. Freeman 
4.1.3  Effects on Provisions of Pension Plans 
In addition to influencing whether or not a firm’s workers have a pen- 
sion plan, unionism is likely to affect the provisions of plans: the way 
workers receive pensions, the amount of vesting and eligibility require- 
ments, the requirements on firms to fund plans. Potential differences in 
the provisions of union and nonunion pension plans provide important 
tests of the role of collective voice and monopoly factors in the impact of 
unions on pensions. In the framework of a simple monopoly model where 
unions try to obtain “ more and more” of all benefits, one could expect 
the provisions of union pension plans to be more “liberal” than those of 
nonunion pension plans in such areas as eligibility, vesting, and related 
rules. In the framework of  a more complex “voice” model under which 
older, more senior workers have a greater say in what unions do, one ex- 
pects the opposite: benefit provisions tilted in favor of more senior em- 
ployees. One further expects union pension plans to be more income re- 
distributive than nonunion  plans,  making pensions less dependent on 
earnings and more on seniority. Indeed, one gets an entire set of  testable 
predictions about pension provisions under unionism by comparing the 
provisions desired by the “median” worker with those desired by the mar- 
ginal worker whose preferences determine competitive contracts (see sec. 
2.4). 
4.2  Empirical Analysis: Provisions of Pensions 
The first and most fundamental question is whether unions do, indeed, 
increase firm expenditures on pensions: Is there a union pension effect, 
and if there is, how does it compare to the union impact on wages? 
To answer these questions I have analyzed five surveys that contain in- 
formation on unionism, pensions, and related other economic factors 
likely to influence pensions. One-the  Expenditures for Employee Com- 
pensation survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics-is  an establishment 
survey that reports whether an establishment has a pension plan and the 
amount of  employer contributions put into the plan. Three of the others 
surveyed individual workers to discover whether they are covered by pen- 
sions. The last survey, of pension plans, contains information on  the years 
the plan has existed, providing a different picture of the union impact by 
dating the creation of the plan. While none of the surveys is perfect, with 
the establishment data lacking information on the personal characteristics 
of  workers and the individual surveys lacking information on employer 
spending, together they present a fairly comprehensive and uniform pic- 
ture of the union impact on pensions. 
Table 4.1 presents the basic results of my analysis of these various sur- 
veys. Column 1 gives the mean value of the pension variable in each sur- 
vey; column 2 gives the coefficient and standard error on unionism in the 95  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
pension equation; column 3 gives the coefficient and standard error on log 
wage in the same equation. The regressions examine four dependent var- 
iables: cents per hour spent on pensions; provision of a pension plan; 
cents per hour spent for those having a plan; and the number of years the 
plan has been in operation. All of the equations are estimated by ordinary 
least squares; experiments with more sophisticated techniques yield com- 
parable findings. All of the calculations control for the wages paid work- 
ers, industry of employment, occupation, and size of establishment where 
available; the analyses of  individual workers also control for the demo- 
graphic features of the workers. 
Table 4.1  Estimates of the Effect of  Collective Bargaining on Provision of 
Pensions and of Employee Contributions  to Pension Funds and of the 
Age of  Pension Plans 
Coefficients 
and Standard Errors 
Log  Collective 
Data, Years, Observations  Sample Mean  Bargaining  Wages 
Establishment  survey 
1. Expenditures for employee 
compensation, private 
industry, production 
workers 1973-77  (7316) 
Pension coverage 
Dollars per hour, all firms 
Dollars per hour, firms 
with pensions 
2.  Expenditures for employee 
compensation, private 
industry, production 
workers  1967-72  (10,888) 
Pension coverage 
Dollars per hour, all 
Dollars per hour, firms 
with pensions 
Person survey 
May Current Population 
Survey, 1979 (7964) blue- 
collar workers 
National Longitudinal 
Survey of  Older Men, 1976 
(1438) 
pension coverage 
Quality of  Employment 
Survey, 1977 (983) 
pension coverage 
pension coverage 
64%  .20 (.01)  .26 (.02) 
.19  .08 (.01)  .32 (.01) 
.30  .002 (.007)  .08  (.002)a 
63  070  .29 (.01)  b 
.09  .04  (.04)  b 
.15  .003 (.005)  b 
41  VQ  .32 (.01)  .23 (.01) 
68%  .26 (.02)  .14 (.02) 
68%  .25 (.03)  .27 (.03) 96  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 4.1 (continued) 
Coefficients 
and Standard Errors 
Data, Years, Observations 
Collective  Log 
Sample Mean  Bargaining  Wages 
Pension plans 
6. Employee Benefit Survey, 
1977 (4878) 
Age of pension plan, single 
employer  10.4  6.3 (.4)  - 
Age of  pension plan, 
multiemployer  13.4  1.6 (1.1)  - 
a Wages, not log wages. 
b lncluded in regression but not reprinted in published article. 
Sources: Calculated from various tapes by ordinary least squares with additional controls as 
follows: 
1. EEC 1973-77, 63 industry controls, 3 region controls, year dummies, and log employ- 
ment . 
2.  EEC 1967-72, as reported in Freeman (1981). 
3. CPS, 4 firm size dummies, age, tenure, tenure’, years of schooling, sex and race dummy 
variables,  eight industry, three region, three marital status, and eight occupation con- 
trols. 
4.  NLS,  10 industry dummies, 9 occupation dummies, 7 experience, experience squared, 
race, and education. 
5. QES, six industry controls, tenure, tenure squared, experience, race, education. 
6.  Department of Labor, EBS-1 files, no additional controls in regressions. 
The figures tell a clear story about what unions do to pensions: they in- 
crease the probability that establishments or workers have a pension plan 
by  sizable and statistically significant amounts and therefore raise the 
contribution of firms to pension plans. In the EEC data the union impact 
on the probability of a pension plan varies from .17 in the 1973-77 tapes 
to .29 in the 1967-72 tapes. In the surveys of individuals the union impact 
ranges from .24 to .32. Given the mean levels of the provision of pensions 
these are all very substantial impacts. The negligible union coefficient on 
pension contributions by firms with pension plans shows, moreover, that 
the union effect occurs largely on whether a firm has a plan, rather than 
on contributions to a plan. This suggests that the absence of data on con- 
tributions or levels of pensions is not a serious drawback: if virtually all of 
the union effect takes the form of  increased coverage, the “are you cov- 
ered by a pension plan?” questions capture everything of interest. 
How does the union impact on pensions compare to the impact  of 
wages on pensions? The final column in the table shows the estimated re- 
sponse of the pension variables to a change in wages. In the linear prob- 
ability equations these coefficients range from 30% higher than the coef- 
ficient on unionism (line 1) to about half the estimated union coefficient 97  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
(line 4), depending on the survey. In the former case, the numbers suggest 
that for a nonunion worker to have as good a chance of having a pension 
as a union worker with the same characteristics his or her wage must be 
116% higher than that of the union worker. In the latter case, the required 
difference is over 500%. The expenditures regressions tell a similar story, 
although here unionism has the same impact as a 28% wage increase. The 
reason for the smaller relative impact of unions on expenditures is that un- 
ions have very little effect on the pensions expenditures by firms that have 
plans. Even so, the estimated impact of unions is very large; taking the ra- 
tio of the coefficient on collective bargaining in the expenditure regression 
in line 1 to the mean expenditure yields .42, which is over twice the esti- 
mated impact of unionism on wages in these data (.18).  I interpret the 
large impact of unions on pensions (with wages fixed) compared to wages 
as indicating that what unions do to pensions involves much more than a 
simple exercise of union monopoly power coupled with standard income 
elasticities of demand for pensions. 
The regression models used to generate the union impacts in table 4.1 
seek, as far as is possible, to compare workers with similar characteristics. 
They answer the question, What does unionism do to the pensions of 
otherwise comparable  workers?  Related  but  somewhat  different ques- 
tions are, What do unions do to the determinants of pensions? and Does 
unionism have a differential impact on the pensions of different types of 
worker? On the basis of  the first section, one could expect differences in 
both respects: the impact of unionism ought to be larger among smaller 
firms, and it ought to reduce the effects of personal characteristics on pen- 
sion coverage, as the desires of  “marginal” workers are dominated by the 
preferences of  “average” workers.  To examine these possible relation- 
ships I have estimated pension equations separately for union and non- 
union workers in the CPS (both blue- and white-collar workers included), 
compared the relevant coefficients, and estimated the union impact on 
workers with the average characteristics of  union members and of  union 
nonmembers from the separate equations. The results, given in table 4.2, 
show the expected differences. The most striking difference in the impact 
of variables on pensions is size of establishment, which is a key determi- 
nant of  whether a nonunion worker has a pension but a modest factor in 
whether or not a union worker has a pension. Panels A and B of figure 4.1 
highlight this important result by showing the differential union impact 
on small as opposed to large firms. In the CPS file unions raise the prob- 
ability that a worker in a firm of less than 100 persons has a pension by 46 
percentage points compared to a bare 8 points in a firm with 1000 + work- 
ers. In the EEC file unions raise expenditures on pensions by 60% in firms 
with less than 500 workers compared to an increase of 6% in firms with 
more than 500 workers. This is consistent with the notion that where firms 
are small, viable pension programs require a large permanent market in- 98  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 4.2  Determinants of  Pension Coverage, Union versus Nonunion Workers 
or Establishments (Current Population Survey) 
Variable 
Estimated Impacts and 
Mean Values  Standard Errors 













































-  .02 (.02) 
-  .26 (.02) 
-  .15 (.01) 
.09 (.02) 
.I0  (.01) 
-  .06  (.Ol) 
.011 (.oo2) 
.I2 (.01) 
-.01  (.01) 
41  41 
3  3 
3  3 
8  8 
3  3 
3  3 
.22  .38 
Predicted  Pension Probabilities 
Worker with union characteristics 
Worker with nonunion characteristics 
.82  .60 
.65  .39 
Source: Calculated from May 1979 CPS separately for union and nonunion workers, with 
3249 union and 11.884 nonunion workers. 
stitution such as unions to provide deferred compensation. Other factors 
whose impact on pension coverage between union and nonunion workers 
differs noticeably are sex, with being female having a smaller impact on 
pension coverage in the union sector, and occupation and industry, which 
tend to have a smaller impact on pension coverage under unionism. The 
smaller role of industry factors under unionism, measured by variation in 
coverage rates by detailed industries in figure 4.2, represents the general 
“standardization”  effect of unionism on personal differentials, which is 
also found in studies of union wage effects (see Freeman 1976; Hirschman 
1976; Nelson 1976). 
The only variable that has a greater effect under unionism is wages: in 
the Current Population Survey wages have a higher elasticity on coverage 
among unionists; however, in the EEC data, they have the same elasticity, 
while in my analysis of earlier EEC data (1967-72), I found a lower elas- 99  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
ticity of  wages for unionists, leading to no clear conclusion about its ef- 
fects (see Freeman  1981). Even with the ambiguous wage coefficients, 
however, the overall pattern of differences in pension determination in 
union and nonunion settings is clear: standard personal and job factors 
matter less under unionism. 
Finally, the summary differences at the bottom of  table 4.2 record the 
results of applying the estimated coefficients from the equation for one 
group to the mean values of characteristics of  the other groups to deter- 
mine predicted coverage for workers of different characteristics under the 
two regimes. They show that unionism raises the coverage of workers with 
the characteristics of union workers by 22 points and raises the coverage 
of workers with the characteristics of nonunion workers by 26 points. 
From the calculations in tables 4.1 and 4.2 I conclude that unionism has 
a positive effect on pensions that is greater for workers with the character- 
istics of union workers but that is still sizable for workers with the charac- 
teristics  of  nonunion  workers.  Moreover,  in  pension  coverage,  as  in 
wages, unionism reduces the effect of personal and sectoral characteris- 
tics on the determination of the outcome. 
Fig. 4.1 
< 100  100-499  500-999  1000 PLUS 
Differential effects of unionism on pensions of  different-sized 
establishments or firms. A, Firm size (Number of  workers); 
calculated from the surveys using the same model as  in table 
4.2, Current Population Survey. PANEL B:  IMPACT  OF  UNIONISM  ON  FRACTION 
OF  WORKERS  COVERED  BY  PENSIONS 
< 500  > =500 
Fig. 4.1 (cont.)  Establishment size; calculated from i..e surveys using the 
same model as in table 4.2, Expenditures for Employee 
Compensation. 
PANEL C: IMPACT OF  UNIONISM  ON 
CENTS  SPENT  ON  PENSIONS 
< 500  > = 500 
Fig. 4.1 (cont.)  C,  Establishment size; calculated from the surveys using the 
same model as in table 4.2, Expenditures for Employee 
Compensation. 101  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
PANEL D:  PERCENTAGE  IMPACT OF UNIONISM 
ON  PENSION  EXPENDITURES 
Fig. 4.1 (cont.)  0,  Establishment size; calculated from the surveys using the 
same model as in table 4.2, Expenditures for Employee 
Compensation. 
4.2.1  Additional Evidence 
Cross-section comparisons like those in tables 4.1 and 4.2 show that 
union workers or establishments are more likely to be covered by pensions 
than nonunion workers or establishments, but do they in fact show that 
unionism causes the observed differences? Maybe unions just happened 
to organize firms with pension plans and have no real impact on pension 
coverage. In recent years, objections of this form have often been raised 
about the diverse nonwage effect of  unionism as well  as about cross- 
sectional unionhonunion wage differences. The force of the objections 
depends on the extent to which analyses control for the independent im- 
pact of variables related to unionism and the likelihood that omitted “un- 
observables” that determine the outcome are correlated with unionism. If 
one controls for numerous other factors and if omitted factors either have 
a random effect on the outcome or are uncorrelated with unionism, the 102  Richard B. Freeman 
cross-section estimates are valid. If these assumptions are not met, the es- 
timates will be biased. 
One way of checking the unions-cause-pension interpretation of  the 
cross-section differences is to examine longitudinal or before/after  data. 
While like all nonexperimental data these data have their own problems 
(for a discussion, see Freeman, in progress), it is important to confirm our 
union effect on them. 
Do firms or workers who change union status also experience a change 
in pension coverage? 
To answer this question I  have tabulated the proportion  of workers 
gainingAosing pension coverage as their union status changes in the 1973- 
77 Quality of Employment panel survey. The results of the analysis, given 
in table 4.3, reveals a union impact on coverage of a magnitude similar to 
that found in the cross-section analysis, with workers who go from non- 
union to union status experiencing a 34 percentage point net increase in 
the probability of  pension coverage compared with essentially no change 
for other groups in the sample. While one might have expected an analo- 
gous decline in the pension coverage of workers who went from union to 
nonunion status, the evidence here shows that those workers experienced 
A:  CURRENT  POPULATION  SURVEY,  MAY 1979 
Fig. 4.2 
UNION  NONUNION 
Coefficients of variation for industry differences on pension 
coverage, union versus nonunion status. A,  CPS, based on 44- 
industry coverage figures as reported in Kotlikoff and Smith 
(1983), table 3.2.9. The average coverage in the union sector 
was .74,  the standard deviation was .15. The rate of coverage 
in the nonunion sector was .46, the standard deviation was .23. 103  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
B :  EXPENDITURES FOR  EMPLOYEE  COMPENSATION 
‘601 
UNION  NONUNION 
Fig. 4.2 (cont.)  B, EEC, based on 63 industries for nonunion and 61 industries 
for union, with industries having less than 5 firms deleted. The 
rate of coverage in the union sector was 239,  the standard 
deviation was .15. The rate of coverage in the nonunion sector 
was .47,  the standard deviation was .24. 
Table 4.3  Changes in Whether a Worker Has a Pension Plan, by Changes in 
Union Status, 1973-77 
~ 
Workers  Workers Losing  Net 
Status of  Worker  Gaining Pension  Pension  Change 
(Number of  Workers)  (YO)  (Yo)  (%) 
Union 1973, union  1977  3 
(182) 
Union  1973, nonunion  1977  11 
(64) 
Nonunion  1973, nonunion  1977  15 
(407) 
Nonunion  1973, union  1977  41 
(44) 
3  0 
13  -2 
10  5 
7  34 
Source: Tabulated from Panel data, 1973-77 Quality of Employment Survey. Based on 687 
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only a slight change. The reason: workers who give up a union job move 
to jobs with higher coverage than the typical nonunion job. In the sample 
covered, 77% of union leavers went to jobs with pensions compared to 
70% pension coverage among workers who were always nonunion. 
Information on pension coverage in newly organized firms supports the 
finding that unionism  raises coverage  in longitudinal  as well as cross- 
section data. In a study of recently unionized white-collar workers, the 
Conference Board reported that immediately after organization 35  ’%  of 
the firms improved their pension programs. (Curtin 1970, p. 63). 
A related way of testing the union impact of pensions is to  compare the 
likelihood that blue-collar workers have pensions in establishments where 
white-collar  workers do or do not have pensions.  If  one believes that, 
rather than inducing firms to set up pension programs, unions organize 
“good employers” who offer such plans for their entire work force, non- 
union and union blue-collar workers should be equally likely to have pen- 
sion plans when the white-collar  workers in their establishment have a 
plan and equally (un)likely to have a plan when the white-collar workers 
do not have a plan. The tabulations in table 4.4 dispel this possibility and 
show that much of the union impact takes the form of unions’ establish- 
ing pension plans in companies that do not have plans for their white-col- 
lar  workers.  Regressions of the difference  between  the likelihood of  a 
company’s having a plan for blue-collar as for white-collar workers yields 
a positive significant union coefficient of  .12, which is only .05 points lower 
than the union  coefficient estimated in table 4.1  .6  While there may be 
something to the company employment  policy  argument,  it is not the 
dominant factor behind the estimated union impact. 
We conclude that unions do indeed increase pension coverage. The in- 
crease is not due to the union wage effect and the normal effect of higher 
wages on the purchase of pensions,  or to unions’  organizing firms that 
happen to have pensions before organization. 
4.3  Pension Provisions 
Because unions are collective organizations whose goals are influenced 
by majority rule, it is reasonable to expect not only the existence (level) of 
Table 4.4  An “Establishment Brothers” Test of the Union Impact on Pensions 
Union Blue-Collar  Nonunion Blue-Collar 
White-collar Workers  Workers Have a  Workers Have a 
Have a Pension Plan  Pension Plan (070)  Pension Plan (To) 






Source: Tabulated from Expenditures for Employee Compensation Surveys with 2594 blue- 
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pensions to differ between union and nonunion settings but also the provi- 
sions of plans. Broadly, unionized plans should reflect the preferences of 
“inframarginal,” older or senior workers to a greater extent than should 
nonunion plans and should also reflect other union policies, such as stan- 
dardization of rates of pay, use of arbitration to decide disputes, and so 
forth. 
To analyze differences between  the provisions  of  union  and of non- 
union pension plans, I have pulled a random sample of nearly 5000 plans 
from the ESB-I file of the U.S.  Department of Labor and estimated the 
impact of unionism on 12 important provisions, with other potential de- 
terminants of provisions  (size of plan, industry, occupation of  workers) 
held fixed.’ In the sample are 4666 single-employer plans, of which 12% 
are union plans; and 212 multiemployer plans, of which 61% are union 
plans.  Because choice of  whether  a plan  is of the defined  benefit  type 
(where workers are promised a given amount at retirement) or of the de- 
fined contribution type (where a given amount is put into the plan for each 
worker, who then obtains an amount dependent on the return) often dic- 
tates other provisions, I report estimates of the union impact for all plans 
and then for all plans with a dummy variable controlling for type of plan. 
In the single-employer  sample  41%  of  the plans  are defined  benefits 
plans; in the multiemployer sample 71 ‘70 are defined benefits plans, but 
not of the standard form since employers’ obligations are limited to con- 
tributing to the fund.* In addition to analyzing the full set of plans, I have 
also examined  separately  the multiemployer,  single-employer,  and de- 
fined benefit  and defined  contribution plans and will  report  differences 
among them that are lost in the regressions for all plans. 
Table 4.5 summarizes the results of analysis of the impact of unionism 
on four basic aspects of pension plans: the type of plan and method of 
payment; eligibility  requirements; dispute resolution; and the nature of 
contributions. The analysis shows sizable differences between the provi- 
sions of union and of nonunion plans, with the bulk of the differences 
consistent with the “collective voice” interpretation of what unions do. 
4.3.1  Rules of Pension Plans 
Benefit type and payments.  Union pension plans are much more 
likely to be defined benefit than defined contribution plans. There are two 
“voice” reasons for this: first, defined benefit plans permit redistribution 
of  benefits from workers who leave the company to those who stay and 
from the young to the old, particularly when plans are first established; 
second, defining benefits rather than contributions puts the risk of fluctu- 
ations in the market value of pension  fund assets onto employers rather 
than workers. 
Union pension plans are more likely to pay benefits on a flat rate, de- 
pendent on years of service rather than on earnings. Paying flat-rate bene- 
1. Table 4.5  Estimates of  the Impact of Unionism on Provisions of  Single-Employer Pension Plans 
Estimated Union 
Effect, Standard  Holding Fixed 
Mean Values 
Union  Nonunion  Error  Type of Plan 
Benefit type and payments 
1.  Defined benefit 
2.  Flat rate 
3.  Integrated with social security plan 
4.  Vesting more liberal than required by law 
Eligibility requirements 
a. in defined benefit 
b.  in defined contribution 
5.  Age and service requirements for receipt of  pension 
6.  Age and service requirements for receipt of  desirability insurance 
7.  Hours worked required 
a. For vesting of  full benefits 
b.  For receipt of  full benefits 
Dispute resolution 
8.  Use arbitration 
Nature of contributions 
9.  Employer contribution related to profits 
10. Employer contribution related to actuarial 
11.  Voluntary employee contributions 
12.  Employer contributions 
































-  .01 (.02) 






-  .26 (.03) 
.22 (.03) 
.08 (.02) 
-  .21 (.03) 
- 
.29 (.01) 
-  .08 (.01) 
.OO (.03) 







-  .08 (.02) 
-  .04 (.02) 
-  .10 (.03) 
.09 (.02) 
Source: Tabulated from EBS-1 forms of Department of Labor with regressions including eight industry dummies, plan size, whether plan for salaried or 
hourly workers (as opposed to both), age of plan, and ratio of beneficiaries to workers, and a dummy for multiemployer plans. 107  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
fits is the pension equivalent of standard rate policies in wages and reflects 
the redistributive goal of unions as a political organization. 
Controlling for type of plan, union pension plans are less likely to take 
advantage  of “social security integration”  possibilities than  nonunion 
plans. Since integrating a plan with social security allows an employee to 
tilt defined benefits in favor of higher-paid workers by deducting from the 
employer’s obligation social security benefits, one could expect unions to 
oppose such schemes. The data show they do. Consistent with our results, 
Kotlikoff and Smith (1983) find that only 11% of union defined benefit 
plans compared to 60% of nonunion defined benefit plans use social secu- 
rity integration formulas. 
Eligibility requirements. The findings with respect to eligibility are 
especially interesting because here a simple monopoly perspective leads to 
quite different predictions than does the collective voice analysis. As noted in 
section 4.1, a simple monopoly model leads one to expect union plans to 
have  more  liberal vesting  and  eligibility requirements  than  nonunion 
plans. In fact, the opposite is true: union plans have vesting provisions 
that tend to be only as liberal as required by law, have both age and service 
requirements (as opposed to separate age or service requirements) not 
found in nonunion plans both for normal retirement and for disability, 
and require more rather than fewer hours worked for workers to be eligi- 
ble for vesting or for receipt of full benefits. Of these findings, the frailest 
appears to be that pertaining to liberal vesting, which is significant only if 
one does not control for type of plan. When I examined the defined bene- 
fit and defined contribution plans separately, however, I found that un- 
ionism reduced liberal vesting in the defined benefit plans but raised it in 
defined contribution plans,  as can be seen in the final column of table 
4.5.9 What explains the general increased eligibility requirements under 
unionism and the divergent effect on vesting in defined benefit and de- 
fined contribution plans? Why do unions not use their monopoly power 
to extract better eligibility provisions in all cases? The voice explanation is 
that the eligibility rules are set to benefit the “average” union member at 
the expense of  the  benefits.  The increased liberality in union  defined 
contribution plans can be explained by the fact that, there, the absence of 
any such transfer among workers means that all will favor more liberal 
vesting. 
Finally, I have also examined the portability provisions of plans-that 
is, the rules governing when employees carry their service credits to a new 
employer-and  found  differences  between  multiemployer  and  single- 
employer defined benefit plans. Unionism increases all forms of portabil- 
ity in multiemployer plans by significant amounts, while among single- 
employer plans, unionism reduces portability by significant amounts (see 
unnumbered table on p. 108). 
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Multiemployer  Single Employer 
Mean  Estimated Impact  Mean  Estimated Impact 
of Unionism  of  Unionism 
Portable among  .71  .16  (.09)  .24  -.11  (.03) 





Portable within  .37  .21  (.11)  .10  -.02  (.03) 
Portable with both  .78  .17  (.09)  .28  -.lo  (.03) 
Here again we can gain insight into the causes of differences from compar- 
ing what an “average” worker would want with  what a marginal worker 
would want. An average employee in an industry with high mobility such 
as construction, where union multiemployer plans predominate, would 
want portability.  An average employee in a factory, where mobility is 
modest and single-employer plans are found, would by contrast have no 
concern for portability. Hence the divergent results. As for the rigid eligi- 
bility rules under unionism, exclusion of marginal workers will lower the 
actuarial cost of pensions to the firm, permitting the senior union workers 
who are eligible to obtain large defined benefits. 
Dispute resolution.  While  neither  union  nor  nonunion  pension 
plans make extensive use of arbitration to resolve disputes about claimed 
pension benefits, union plans are far more likely to rely on arbitration 
than are nonunion plans. 
5.  Nature of  contributions. Union pension plans also differ signifi- 
cantly in the nature of employer’s and employee’s contributions to the 
pension fund. Union plans are much less likely to relate contributions to 
profits than are nonunion plans and are much more likely to make em- 
ployer contributions a fixed bargained amount or determined by the actu- 
arial rate for the plan. (The effect on actuarial contributions is due to the 
choice of a defined benefit plan.) On the worker side, union plans are less 
likely to involve voluntary worker contributions, largely though not ex- 
clusively by having fixed benefit plans in which worker contributions do 
not affect benefits. 
In sum, union pension plans differ greatly from nonunion plans in ways 
that are, in general, explicable by the “collective voice” face of the institu- 
tion. 
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4.3.2  Levels of  Benefits 
Thus far I have discussed various aspects of pension plan provisions but 
not actual pension benefits received. Do union pensioners get more? This 
is  a difficult question to answer because surveys of  retirees rarely ask 
about the prior union status of  the retirees. In the one survey that does 
contain such information, the Department of Labor’s 1979 Survey of Pri- 
vate Pension Benefit Amounts, Kotlikoff and Smith (1983, table 3.8.1) 
find that  union  pensioners  do about as well  as nonunion  pensioners. 
Among male workers, the ratio of pension benefits to preretirement earn- 
ings is  .194 for union workers compared to .180 for nonunion workers 
and among women, .198 (union) and .170 (nonunion). This is consistent 
with the table 4.1 finding that union  employers contribute to pension 
plans an amount (wages fixed) similar to that contributed by nonunion 
employers who have pension plans. 
In inflationary times a key aspect of pension plans is the extent to which 
benefits of  retired workers are adjusted for inflation. While few private 
plans in the United States contain formal provisions for cost-of-living ad- 
justment (COLA), it is common to grant such adjustments. 
For example, the 1980 Bankers’ Trust study of pension plans showed 
that 69% of the plans surveyed offered some cost-of-living adjustment to 
retirees between 1975 and 1980. For workers who retired in 1965, the ad- 
justment was 20% of their promised pension. For workers who retired in 
1970 (and whose pay and therefore pensions were higher) the average 
gain was 17% whereas for workers who retired in 1975 it was 8% (Bank- 
ers’ Trust 1980, pp. 53, 55). As inflation in the period was 6370,  however, 
even the oldest group suffered serious loss in the value of their retirement 
Pay. 
Whether union plans are more or less likely to adjust upward the bene- 
fits of retired workers is unclear: on the one hand, the current workers 
who generally ratify contracts will prefer a dollar of wage today to  a dollar 
of retirement benefit for retirees; on the other hand, current workers will 
also prefer to have their retirement pay indexed in some fashion. In some 
unions, moreover, retired workers vote for union leadership, while in at 
least one (the United Mine Workers) they vote on contract acceptance as 
well. 
Evidence on the adjustment of pensions to inflation by union status of 
the pension plan has been provided to me by Steven Allen, Robert Clarke, 
and Daniel Summer of North Carolina State University. Table 4.6 shows 
that, in their data, unionized workers were given better inflation protec- 
tion after they are retired than nonunion workers, implying that the desire 
of current workers to index retirement pay dominates their desire to spend 
more on themselves and less on retirees. 110  Richard B. Freeman 
Table 4.6  Number of Increases for 1973 Beneficiaries, 1973-78, and Percentage 
Increase in Value  of Pensions, by  Union Status 








19.4  32.0 
8.9  19.1 
17.9  21 .o 
4.8  17.5 
4.8  8.3 
10.3  0.9 
33.9  1.3 
Value of  Pension,  1973-78  (To) 
All  27.1  18.1 
Only those with increases  33.6  26.6 
Rate of  inflation of  CPI  63.3  63.3 
Source: Steven Allen, Robert Clark, and Daniel Sumner, “Pension Benefits and Inflation,” 
work in progress, North Carolina State University. 
4.4  Implication for Earnings Profiles 
One of the most puzzling results of union wage studies is the finding 
that the shape of age-earnings profiles rises less rapidly for union than for 
nonunion workers, despite the presumed greater influence of older (more 
senior) workers in union settings. To what extent does this puzzle reflect 
the failure of the wage studies to take account of the greater pension cov- 
erage under unionism and the greater value of defined benefit pensions to 
older workers? 
To answer this question I estimate the present value of expected pension 
benefits for workers of different ages and then add the increment in the 
present value in a year to their income in that year. If  the increment in 
present value divided by the wage is greater for older workers than for 
younger workers, the result will be a tilt favorable to older workers, and 
contrarily if the increment in present value over wages is greater for youn- 
ger workers. The simplest formula for estimating the present value of pen- 
sion wealth (PW) is 
PW  = h,WRt/(l + r + m)65-t 
where X = ratio of present value of pension earnings received as retiree at 
time of retirement (lump sum equivalent of pension receipts) to final year 
earnings;  WR,  = real earnings at year of retirement for workers t years 
before retirement; m = probability of not receiving pension due to mor- 
tality or mobility; and t = years before receipt of pension. Assuming that 
X is fixed and that the wage at retirement rises with the growth of  real 
earnings, we obtain 111  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
(12) 
where W,  is the worker’s current wage. 
Then, for ease of analysis let W be the same for workers of different 
ages-a  reasonable assumption for blue-collar labor-and  take the first 
difference of (12)  to obtain the annual increment in PW: 
(13)APW 5:  hW[1/(1  + r + rn -  g)65-r-1  - 1/(1 + r -  g + rn)65-t], 
which yields 
(14)  MW/W  = h[l/(l  + r + in -  ~)]~~-l(r  + m -  8). 
As long as r + m -  g > 0, the increment in present value is positive (that 
is, as long as growth of real wages does not exceed the discount and mobil- 
ity factors). Regardless of the sign of r + rn -  g, the change in present 
value is greater for older workers since [I/(  1 + r + rn -  g)I6’ - is greater 
for them when r + rn -  g is positive and smaller when r + rn -  g is nega- 
tive. Hence, in this model, unions tilt the profile toward older workers, 
with the tilt rising exponentially. 
To provide order of magnitude estimates of the tilt, assume that h = 2, 
so that the lump sum value of  pensions is twice a year’s final pay in that 
year, and let r + rn -  g take values ranging from .03 to .lo. Table 4.7 pre- 
sents the resultant  estimates of the impact of the changes in discounted 
value of pensions on the earnings of workers at different ages. At low val- 
ues of  r + m -  g,  the differences in the changes by age are smaller (they 
are zero when r  + m - g is zero); at higher values, the gains to older 
workers are substantial. 
What happens if older workers have, as seems plausible, lower mobility 
rates or are vested and thus do not lose their pension rights when mobile? 
We can read the answers to these questions in the table by applying differ- 
ent values of r + m -  g to the different age groups. When older workers 
are less mobile, the value of m  for them will be smaller than for younger 
workers, reducing the relevant increase in pension wealth for the older 
workers. When a worker is vested and leaves, m  is zero but so too is g,  so 
PW = hWt/(l + r -  g + rn)65-t, 
Table 4.7  Changes in Earnings Due to Increments in Pension Wealth 
Values of  r  + m -  g 
Age  Earnings  .03  .05  .07  .10 
25  1 .oo  1.9%  1.4%  .9%  .O% 
35  1 .oo  2.5%  2.3%  1.8%  1.1% 
45  I .oo  3.3%  3.8%  3.6%  3.0% 
55  1 .oo  4.4%  6.1  To  7.1 %  7.1070 
65  1 .oo  6.0%  10.0%  14.0%  20.0% 
Source: Based on formula APW/ W = X(l + r + m -  g)‘-65(r + m -  g). 112  Richard B. Freeman 
that the value of his pension wealth will depend solely on the discount fac- 
tor. Depending on the assumptions one makes, one will obtain different 
magnitudes for the increment in pension wealth by age, with, however, a 
general pattern of  greater increases for older workers, as can be seen by 
comparing the maximum increase for the youngest group (1.9% in the 
column under .03) with the minimum increase for the oldest group (6.0% 
in the same column). 
Finally, is the change in earnings at different ages due to increments in 
pension wealth enough to overturn the puzzling greater impact of union- 
ism on the wages of young as opposed to older workers? 
To answer this question  I have estimated the effect of unions on log 
wages for blue-collar workers in four different age groups, using the Cur- 
rent Population Survey, and then adjusted the union coefficients for the 
omission of pensions by multiplying the estimated impact of unionism on 
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Differential  corrected  for  pensions  assuming  minimum  impact (R+M-G=.03) 
Fig. 4.3  Estimates of  the union wage differential and the differential 
corrected for the increased income worth of  pensions, by age. 
Source:  Estimates of  the union wage advantage from May 
Current Population Survey 1979, with control variables for 
demographic and industry characteristics, as reported in 
Freeman and Medoff (1984).  Estimates of union impact on 
pension value obtained by multiplying values in table 4.7 by 
.30, where .30 is an aproximate estimate of the impact of 
unions on the provision of  pensions from table 4.1. 113  Unions, Pensions, and Union Pension Funds 
pension coverage by the minimum table 4.7 estimates of the income value 
of the pensions by age. The results, shown in figure 4.3, suggest that in 
these data at least the union pension impact does not quite reverse the 
finding of  a flatter  age-earnings profile  for union  than  for nonunion 
workers, though it has a noticeable effect on the estimated union advan- 
tage among the oldest group of  workers. While the greater provision of 
pensions  under  unionism  does not  completely reverse the flatter  age- 
wages profile under unionism, analyses of the impact of the full spectrum 
of  union seniority advantages (including health, vacation, job security) 
may overturn this result. Pensions are part of the union seniority package 
but not the whole. 
4.5  Union Use of Employee Pension Funds: New Tool in 
Labor’s Arsenal? 
The assets of our pension fund represent the deferred wages of our 
members, and we  believe that the union should have an equal voice in 
managing those assets. [A UNION  LOCAL PRESIDENT]” 
Goals for Union Participation in Pension Fund Management Established 
by AFL-CIO Executive Council (AFL-CIO 1981) 
To increase employment through reindustrialization  including manu- 
facturing,  construction,  transportation,  maritime  and  other  sectors 
necessary to revitalize the economy. 
To advance social purposes such as workers’ housing and health cen- 
ters. 
To improve the ability of workers to exercise their rights as share- 
holders in a coordinated fashion. 
To exclude from union pension plan investment portfolios compan- 
ies whose policies are hostile to workers’ rights. 
Proposed use of union pension funds to “advance social purposes” and 
to strengthen unionism represents the major innovation in the union pen- 
sion area in the 1980s, with potentially important consequences for the 
economy and unionism. Because private pension funds are major factors 
in capital markets, owning upward of 12% of corporate equities and 27% 
of  corporate and foreign bonds in 1980 and increasing their share over 
time, and because union pension funds constitute perhaps one-half of the 
total, many analysts and unionists have viewed them as a potentially im- 
portant weapon in the union’s arsenal (Kotlikoff and Smith 1983, table 
5.5.7). The press, including business publications, have called for greater 
innovation  in traditionally  conservative pension  fund  investments.  In 
1978 Randy Barber and Jeremy Rifkind wrote an important book advo- 
cating that union pension fund moneys be invested in unionized parts of 
the economy, rather than in nonunion sectors, endangering jobs of mem- 
bers. Indicative of the importance unions now attach to pension fund in- 114  Richard B. Freeman 
vestments, in  1980 the AFL-CIO’s Industrial Union Department began 
publishing a bimonthly journal, Labor and Investment, dealing with is- 
sues of pension fund investments. In Fall 1981, the Journal of Labor Re- 
search  published  a  symposium on “Union  Use  of  Employee Pension 
Funds,” one indication of growing academic interest. 
There are two important questions regarding union pension fund in- 
vestments: (1) Does investment in “socially desirable” areas or exclusion 
“from union pension plan investment portfolios of companies . . . hos- 
tile to worker rights” require union pension funds to take lower returns 
than they otherwise could earn? (2) Are some investments in lower return 
projects desirable to unionized workers and, if so, are these investments 
legal? 
Because of  the newness of  the issues and the consequent paucity  of 
data, I can offer only tentative answers to these questions, with far less 
documentation than in the other parts of this study. 
4.5.1 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that union pension funds 
can shun the stocks of anti-union firms without lowering returns to port- 
folios. In theory, if  the stock exchange is an efficient market union pen- 
sion funds should be able to earn normal returns, with normal risk, by ex- 
cluding a moderate number of  companies from their portfolio.  If it is 
widely recognized in the market that certain nonunion firms offer, for 
whatever reason,  better  profit prospects,  their  stock prices will reflect 
this, so that a fund will not lose by shunning them. In a “thick” market 
with the equity of thousands of  companies for sale, one ought to be able 
to obtain the same valued portfolio by choosing the stock of  predomi- 
nantly union firms rather than those of comparable nonunion firms. 
Limited empirical evidence on the returns from investments of pension 
funds that do or do not shun major nonunion companies provides sup- 
port for this argument.  In 1978 the Corporate Data Exchange analyzed 
the  portfolios  of  75  union-related  pension  plans  and  20  employer- 
controlled plans and found that the former held half as much of their 
portfolio in the stocks of  15  major predominantly nonunion companies 
such as McDonald’s, Sears, and Texas Instruments.”  How did the stocks 
of these companies fare in the market? From  1977 to 1982, a weighted 
average of those stocks did worse than the market averages: excluding 
Sears Roebuck, which performed especially poorly, and which is bought 
in large amounts by  the Sears Pension Fund, the nonunion companies 
earned a 36% return compared to a 45% gain in the Standard and Poor’s 
500; including Sears, the return on the nonunion firms’ stock was  19% 
(Dreben 1983). Over this five-year period, the union-related plans did well 
to shun the stocks of  these firms. More generally, comparison of median 
rates of return for some union plans (Taft-Hartley multiemployer plans) 
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and nonunion plans by A. G.  Becker Company of Chicago show rough 
similarities in returns on equity for the two, with union plans earning 
slightly more in half the years and slightly less in half the years (see table 
4.8). 
The evidence thus supports the “efficient market”  argument that un- 
ions can direct investment funds away from certain stocks without sacri- 
ficing returns. By the same token, however, one expects such a policy to 
have essentially no real economic impact. In a market with millions of in- 
vestors, the decision to shun certain companies is unlikely to  have any per- 
manent effect on their stock prices. In short, excuding from union pen- 
sion plan portfolios nonunion companies will harm neither the pension 
fund nor those firms. Its only impact will be psychic. 
Does this mean that union influence on pension fund stock market in- 
vestments is a mere chimera? 
Not necessarily. If union pension fund ownership of  the shares of  a 
company were used to pressure management through the board of direc- 
tors, ownership could prove to be a tool in labor’s arsenal. However, to do 
this the unions would have to invest in, rather than shun, the stocks of ma- 
jor nonunion firms. Barber and Rifkind (1978, pp. 156-57) report the re- 
sults of just such an effort in 1954 when the Teamsters used their Mont- 
gomery Ward stock in the midst of a proxy fight to convince management 
to agree to collective bargaining. Similarly, James Bennett and Manuel 
Johnson (1982, p. 187) point out union use of pension funds to pressure 
the bankers, insurance company executives, and boards of  organization 
that held much of the debt of  the J. P. Stevens Company to get the com- 
pany to stop blatant, illegal efforts to prevent unionization.  In both of 
these situations, it was pension fund ownership (or influence on the own- 
ers) of company equity or debt that allowed the unions to influence com- 
Table 4.8  Median Rates of Return on Equity Portion of Pension Plan Portfolio, 
1973-82 
Taft-Hartley 
Year  (Union) 
1973  -21.7 
1974  -31.0 
1975  33.0 
1976  20.3 
1977  7.1 
1978  7.4 
1979  18.9 
1980  30.9 
1982  25.3 
1981  -3.1 
Corporate 
Plans 








-  5.0 
21.9 
~~ 
Source: A. G. Becker Co., telephone interview, March 3, 1983. 116  Richard B. Freeman 
pany behavior. If union pension funds follow the suggestion of the AFL- 
CIO Executive  Council  they  will  reduce,  not enhance,  the impact  of 
unions on management. 
4.5.2  Actual Investment Projects 
It is in the area of specific investment projects, such as investments in 
unionized  construction  designed to “create”  jobs, where union pension 
plans might accept, for good reason, lower returns. This is because such 
investments will increase employment of organized labor only if the pen- 
sion fund offers the firm more attractive loan terms than can be gotten 
elsewhere. Under some circumstances union investments in projects that 
earn a lower return than could otherwise be gotten but that create jobs for 
union workers may benefit union members. 
First, some of the wage bill of unionized firms will go into the pension 
fund, which may offset lower returns and enhance the financial position 
of the fund. Because the greater employment may also create added obli- 
gations for the plan, however, one cannot in general conclude that this 
will be the case. In the case of construction industry pension funds, the is- 
sue depends on eligibility rules (How much of  the increased work force 
will stay in the sector long enough to be vested?)  and on benefit  rules 
(How many hours per year earn workers credits for pensions?) and on  the 
rates of contribution and the benefits paid out, as well as on the difference 
between rate of return from the investment and the best alternative. Some 
pension plans may likely to do  better as a result of the greater contribution 
while others will not. Those that do  can justify taking lower returns. 
The second and more important reason for unions to take lower returns 
is to “create” or “save” union jobs. If a union takes a slightly lower return 
on a pension  fund investment that employs workers at union rates, the 
total return to  members, consisting of the lower return in the capital mar- 
ket and the higher return on the labor market (the union wage effect), 
could exceed the higher return the fund could earn with its moneys. If the 
goal of  the union investment is to maximize the wealth of members, tak- 
ing a lower return on the caital side can be justified. The criterion for the 
investment  should not be the return on capital with labor valued at the 
union wage but rather the return on capital with labor valued at the non- 
union wage rate. In project analysis terms, this is the “shadow cost” of 
labor. 
The strategy may be justifiable, but is it optimal? Should not the union 
reduce wages to create jobs rather than offer investment funds at an at- 
tractive rate? 
Unless the union sets employment as well as wages, it may be better to 
offer capital funds at a lower return. This is because by controlling the 
amount of the investment, as well as the return, the union can manipulate 
the employer to the “optimal” discriminating monopolist point, which it 
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labor ratios are fixed, the union can invest enough capital in a project to 
hire the same number of workers the firm would hire in a competitive 
market and can extract all of the “quasi rent” from the firm via higher 
wages. From this perspective, use of pension fund capital can augment 
union power in the labor market. 
Whether investment strategies for the purpose of raising employment 
are legal under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA) is, however, unclear. Plan fiduciaries are obligated to  act “solely 
in the interest of  participants and beneficiaries”  for the “exclusive pur- 
pose of providing benefits” to them.I2 If the workers who obtain the high- 
wage union jobs were identical with the beneficiaries, perhaps such an in- 
vestment  strategy would  be  legal.  But  in general the workers will  be 
younger employees and the beneficiaries older employees, and it may be 
that a  strategy that benefits employed union members  but  is possibly 
harmful to pension  beneficiaries is illegal.  On the other hand, the en- 
hanced monopoly power due to strategic use of pension fund investments 
could be used to benefit beneficiaries as well, even when the pension fund 
return is lower. It could do this by bargaining for higher defined benefits 
at  the expense of the union wage differential. 
Have union pension plans sacrificed returns to enhance employment 
prospects? 
The limited data I have seen suggests that they have not, at least notice- 
ably. AETNA Insurance, which manages a large Union Separate Account 
for investment in union construction, reports earning returns above those 
that could be obtained in the bond market.” My discussions in Southern 
California with pension fund officials suggest similar good returns, thus 
far, with concern over fiduciary impossibilities making officials wary of 
taking lower returns for the sake of union jobs. 
4.6  Conclusion 
This paper has examined the role of  trade unions in pension coverage, 
expenditures by firms for pensions, the provisions of pension plans, the 
impact  of  pensions on age-earnings profiles,  and pension  fund invest- 
ments. It has four basic findings: 
1. Unions greatly increase pension coverage and alter the determinants 
of coverage in ways that go beyond the monopoly wage effects of union- 
ism. 
2. Unions alter the provisions of pension plans in ways that benefit se- 
nior workers and that equalize pensions among workers. 
3. Estimates of the age-earnings profile of union members are flawed 
by  failure to take account of  the union impact on pensions,  which en- 
hances the earnings of  the oldest groups. 
4.  Union pension funds can and do shun the stocks of nonunion firms 
without lowering the value of the portfolio. Investments in actual projects 118  Richard B. Freeman 
that take lower returns are, up to a point, justifiable in terms of the full 
economic benefits accruing to workers. 
Notes 
1. The first union retirement plan was established in 1905 by the Granite Cutters’ Interna- 
tional Association of America, according to American Council of  Life Insurance, Pension 
Facts, 1978-1979, p. 37, as cited by Munnell(l982). 
2.  In the Inland Steel Company case (1948), a National Labor Relations Board ruling that 
pensions were a mandatory subject was upheld by the Seventh Circuit. Inland Steel Co. v. 
NLRB,  170F 2d 247, 22 LRRM 2505 (CA 7, 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960, 24 LRRM 
2019 (1949). 
3.  If Cis  the fixed cost in instituting the program, the total cost function TC = C + WL 
+ PL. Differentiation with respect to P  yields WpL + L = 0. This model assumes that the 
firm is indifferent between paying pensions or paying hourly rates. 
4.  The assumption that ordering workers by attachment to the firm also orders them by 
preferences for pensions is the key assumption in the analysis. In the model all workers of the 
same tenure with a firm are treated as if they had the same preference for pensions, making 
the difference in tenure the sole cause of different desires. When worker preferences for pen- 
sions differ for reasons unrelated to attachment to the firm, the competitive market will pro- 
duce different sets of compensation packages, with more pensions in some establishments 
than in others to attract those preferring pensions. Variation of this type is ignored to con- 
centrate on the situation in which preferences differ by potential mobility or tenure in the 
firm. 
5. For a detailed discussion of  this maximal in the context of work quality, see Viscusi 
(1980). 
6.  This regression was performed for all of the 4668 establishments with the same controls 
as those used in table 4.1, line 1. 
7.  This work builds on the earlier analysis of Engberg, (1980). 
8.  These so-called Taft-Hartley plans are defined benefit plans from the perspective of the 
worker who is promised a fixed pension, but not from the point of view of the firm. 
9.  In the Kotlikoff-Smith examination of the EBS-1 file (which did not control for other 
factors, but which includes the full sample) they found union plans to  be less generous with 
vesting. Fifteen percent of  nonunion plans in their sample have full and immediate vesting 
compared to a bare 3% among union plans; 52% of nonunion plans have partial or complete 
vesting after three years of service compared to a bare 7% of  union plans (Kotlikoff and 
Smith 1983, table 3.8.1). 
10. Labor and Investments  citation by local president  of  International Association of 
Machinists. 
11. Corporate Data Exchange, stock held by 101 selected pension funds in 32 companies 
identified as “socially controversial,” as reported in Barth and Cordes (1981). 
12. 29 U.S.C.  1104  (a) (1). For a discussion of legal issues see Bredloff (1982). 
13.  See AETNA Life Insurance, first Annual Report on  Union Separate Account (1983). 
Comment  Albert Rees 
This paper consists of three parts of  unequal length: a short first part 
discusses why unionism might increase the probability of pension cover- 
age, a much longer second part presents evidence that it does, and a short 
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third part deals with the investment policies of union pension funds. The 
principal argument of the first part is that unions are more likely than em- 
ployers to give heavy weight to the views of older workers in dividing com- 
pensation between wages and pensions. Employers are most interested in 
recruiting and retaining young workers, who may place a relatively low 
value on pensions because they discount the distant future heavily. Older 
workers are easier to retain than young workers because their natural mo- 
bility is lower and they have other benefits related to seniority. The median 
voter in a democratic union will be closer to retirement age than the new 
recruit and will therefore place a higher value on pension benefits. If the 
union is  autocratic,  the controlling group is probably even older,  and 
more concerned with pensions, than the median voter.  I find this argu- 
ment novel and convincing, although as Freeman states it is not the only 
explanation of the positive association between unions and pension cover- 
age. 
The second part of the paper demonstrates by analyzing a variety of 
data sets  that  unions  do indeed  increase  pension  coverage  by  large 
amounts. The principal way in which they do so is by increasing the pen- 
sion coverage of small firms. The creation of collectively bargained multi- 
employer pension funds creates a convenient mechanism through which 
the small employer can offer pension coverage at low administrative cost. 
Given that a firm has a pension plan, Freeman finds that unions do not 
have a substantial effect on  the cost of the plan. The use of data from a va- 
riety of sources and of different types makes this part of the paper highly 
convincing. 
The principal point of the third part of the paper is that union pension 
funds avoid investing in the securities of leading nonunion employers and 
that this restriction has not lowered their mean return on investment. This 
argument is sound as far  as it goes but is subject to serious limitations. The 
restriction on investments in union pension plans may have maintained 
mean yields only at the cost of higher variance in returns, a possibility that 
is not considered. More important, the avoidance of nonunion firms is 
only one possible union objective in setting investment policy. Others in- 
clude promoting the employment of union members, avoiding firms with 
operations in the Union of South Africa, and promoting socially desirable 
investments such as low-cost housing. Pursuing several of these goals at 
once could have a pronounced effect in lowering rates of return or raising 
risks. 
In the multiemployer plans set up under the Taft-Hartley Act with both 
union and management trustees, the obligations of the individual employer 
are fulfilled by making the required contributions. The investment perfor- 
mance of  the fund over a long period will determine the size of the pen- 
sions that can ultimately be paid. If the trustees sacrifice only a little yield, 
the working of compound interest over a worker’s life will transform this 
into a large difference in outcome. 120  Richard B. Freeman 
The paper does not  discuss the cases in which the trustees of  Taft- 
Hartley pension plans have conspicuously departed from sound invest- 
ment practices. Although these may be few, they are not unimportant. 
The most conspicuous case is that of  the Teamsters Central States, 
Southeast, and Southwest Area Pension Fund.’ As of the mid-l970s, this 
fund covered 400,000 working teamsters and 70,000 retirees and had large 
unfunded liabilities. The District Director of the Internal Revenue Service 
in  Chicago found  “trust funds invested for a return not commensurate 
with prevailing rates” and “trust funds invested against the advice of pro- 
fessional advisers retained by the trust.” As of  1975, when its total assets 
were $1,363 million, the fund had nine “questionable” loans totaling $332 
million in hotels, casinos, and undeveloped land. In 1983 a former trustee 
of the fund, Roy L. Williams (also president of the International Brother- 
hood of Teamsters), was found guilty by a federal jury of defrauding the 
fund. 
In passing the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress no doubt thought that the 
presence of both union and management trustees of multiemployer funds 
would serve as protection against this kind of abuse. In the Central States 
Teamsters fund, management trustees appear to have played a passive 
role because they feared retaliation in collective bargaining if they insisted 
on orthodox investment policies. 
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